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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The jury in this case held that plaintiff had proved defendant was negligent but that 
defendant's negligence did not proximately cause plaintiffs injury. The trial court, prior 
to trial, had ruled that the construction contract entered into between the defendant and 
federal government would not be admitted into evidence and barred plaintiffs 
construction expert from testifying. 
Both rulings were in error and the excluded evidence went directly to the issue of 
proximate causation. Had the excluded evidence been received by the jury it would have 
had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict. Plaintiff is, therefore, 
entitled to a new trial. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. In reviewing the trial court's legal conclusion to exclude the construction 
contract from evidence the review is for correctness, granting no deference. Aultv. 
HoIden,P.3d781. 
2. The review of the trial court's decision to exclude plaintiffs expert 
testimony is for an abuse of discretion. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445 
(Utah App. 1989) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following the trial court's evidentiary rulings the case was tried to a jury. The jury 
held that plaintiff had proved defendant U-Systems was negligent as alleged (Jury 
Instruction No. 26, R. 567) but that defendant U-Systems' negligence was not a 
proximate cause of plaintiff s injury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Yvonne Day was a construction inspector employed at Hill Air Force Base 
(HAFB). She worked for the federal government (Transcript, 67). It was her job to see 
that civilian contractors at HAFB performed their work in compliance with the 
requirements of the Uniform Building Code. (TR. 68) Therefore, she was required to go 
to the various construction sites on HAFB to perform her inspections. 
Defendant U-Systems, Inc. had bid on and received a government contract to 
renovate approximately 78 housing units located on HAFB. (TR. 70) The contract 
contained specific safety requirements: 1) that Federal OSF1A standard had to be 
complied with; 2) that US Army Corps of Engineer safety standards had to be met (R. 
222-227); 3) that U-Systems was required to keep the construction site safe for anyone, 
including federal government employees, who came onto the site (TR. 81-82); and 4) 
that defendant U-Systems had to have a full-time safety person on site. (TR. 79) 
On November 18, 1997, a representative of defendant U-Systems called Allen 
Collins, the federal government project manager, and asked for an insulation inspection in 
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one of the housing units. (TR. 83) Yvonne Day was sent to the site to conduct the 
inspection. She was accompanied by Lareen Parkinson, a new trainee in the construction 
inspection office. 
At the site, in a duplex, Ms. Day and Ms. Parkinson encountered sheetrock leaned 
vertically against a stud wall. The individual sheets were approximately 15 ft. in length. 
There were eight sheets. Each sheet weighed in excess of 100 lbs. Defendant's 
construction superintendent acknowledged at trial that sheetrock stored on edge is a 
hazard (TR. 199) because it can fall and the degree of hazard is dependent entirely on 
how vertically the sheetrock is stacked (TR. 201) if not laid flat or tied off. 
Behind the sheetrock was the insulation Ms. Day had been sent to inspect. It was 
her job to confirm proper installation. It appeared to have been installed incorrectly and 
in fact was not in compliance with building code requirements. (TR. 85) As Ms. Day 
attempted to peer over the top of the sheetrock to assess the situation (Ms. Day is only 5 
ft. tall), Lareen Parkinson, the new employee, pulled on one end of the stack believing 
that would help Ms. Day see the insulation. As she did so, the sheetrock (weighing 
collectively between 800 - 900 lbs.) was immediately overbalanced and all fell away from 
the wall (TR. 133) knocking Ms. Day to the floor causing Ms. Day to sustain, among 
other injuries, a skull fracture. 
Federal OSHA regulation 1926.250(a)(1) (R. 227) directs that "all materials stored 
in tiers shall be stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked, or otherwise secured to prevent 
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sliding, falling or collapse." "Tiers" according to its ordinary dictionary meaning is "any 
of a series of rows, layers, ranks, etc. arranged one above or behind another". (R. 228). 
The US Army Corps of Engineers' safety rules referenced by the construction contract 
similarly require that "Tools, materials and equipment subject to displacement or falling 
be adequately secured." (R. 226) The incorporated contract "General Requirements" 
required defendant to protect Ms. Day. These were specific duties undertaken by 
defendant U-Systems for consideration.1 
Defendant's construction manager acknowledged at trial that defendant's 
employees should have observed the insulation problem and corrected it before Ms. Day 
was called to the site to perform her inspection. (TR. 211) Had they done so, Ms. Day 
would not have encountered the hazard. 
In sum, it was plaintiffs contention at trial that the insulation had not been 
correctly installed; that defendant or its employees should have identified and corrected 
the situation prior to calling for the inspection; that the sheetrock as placed and leaned in 
front of the insulation was a hazard; that it was foreseeable that Ms. Day in the 
performance of her job duties would likely encounter the hazard in view of the improper 
insulation installation and in doing so the sheetrock unless laid flat or secured could fall 
!The "General Requirements" are referred to in the record as an attachment to Plaintiffs 
Response to Defendant U-Systems Trial Bench Memo on Duty (R. 296) but the attachment is not 
found in the record, therefore plaintiff refers to the quoted language from the "General 
Requirements" found. (R. 297) The transcripts of the motion hearings likewise refer on 
numerous occasions to the "General Requirements" so appellant doesn't know why the actual 
attachment is not included in record. 
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on her as it did causing her injuries. 
In support of her theories of negligence and causation, plaintiff sought to introduce 
as evidence at trial the contract between the federal government and defendant U-Systems 
and its incorporated or referenced safety standards because it delineated specific safety 
requirements on U-Systems, running to federal employees, and others on the job site 
which U-Systems for consideration accepted (i.e. Federal OSHA standards, the US Army 
Corps of Engineers safety requirements and the written responsibility contained in the 
contracts "General Requirements" of site safety running specifically to government 
employees who needed to on the site) and delineated specific safety codes to which 
defendant U-Systems agreed to comply. Further, plaintiff sought to provide expert 
testimony about what those safety standards meant in the construction trade and what acts 
on the part of the contractor were necessary to comply with the Federal OSHA standards 
and US Army Corps of Engineers' standards referenced by the contract to meet its duty of 
care to plaintiff in this case regarding the safe storage of the sheetrock prior to its 
installation. 
In the latter regard, plaintiff employed Ken Todd who is a construction expert and 
has wide experience in residential and commercial construction of the type being 
performed at HAFB (R. 203-204) and understood the application and meaning of the 
federal standards within the construction industry regarding safe storage of sheetrock. It 
would have been his testimony that defendant U-Systems and its subcontractors were 
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negligent in failing to lay the sheetrock flat so it would not present a fall hazard to Ms. 
Day or alternatively in failing to secure the sheetrock to the wall, tying it off, so it could 
not fall on her or anyone else who needed to be around it if they felt the need to stack it 
vertically. (R. 198-202) (R. 191-192) 
Defendant U-Systems filed motions in limine to exclude introduction of the 
contract into evidence at trial arguing the contract did not provide evidence of a duty of 
care owed by the defendant to Ms. Day and that Mr. Todd was not competent to testify as 
an expert in Utah because his work experience had been in Nevada and California but not 
Utah. Therefore, he had no knowledge about Utah OSHA standards. The court granted 
both motions. 
Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury which concluded "that defendant U-
Systems was negligent but its negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff s injury." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously excluded evidence from trial bearing directly on the 
issue of proximate cause. Had that evidence been received by the jury, it would have had 
a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE FAILURE TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE AT 
TRIAL RELEVANT INFORMATION BEARING ON 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION HAS A SUBSTANTIAL 
INFLUENCE ON TRIAL OUTCOME. 
A jury may conclude that a defendant was negligent but its acts or omissions were 
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not a proximate cause of plaintiff s injury Holmstrom v. C.R. England. 8 P.3d 281 (Utah 
App. 2000) however "the determination of proximate cause is not a pure fact question, it 
is largely a conclusion available from the facts adduced" Milligan v. Capitol Furniture 
Co.. 335 P.2d 619 (Utah 1959) (emphasis added) at trial. In other words "The plaintiff 
must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is 
more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result." 
Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) (emphasis 
added) Consequently, the sum and character of the evidence adduced at trial is always 
significant because the addition or omission of even a single admissible evidentiary fact, 
document or opinion may well change entirely the deductions or inferences arising from 
the facts concerning proximate causation. 
Footnote 2 in Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co.. recognized the precise point: 
It is true that the question of proximate cause is ordinarily 
one of fact for the jury. This is so because of different 
conclusions generally arising on a conflict of the evidence, or 
because of different deductions or inferences arising from 
undisputed facts, in respect to the question of whether the injury 
was the natural and probable consequence of the proved 
negligence or wrongful act and ought to have been foreseen in 
light of the attending circumstances..." (emphasis added) 
Therefore, in a case where the jury has concluded the defendant's acts or 
omissions were negligent as alleged the exclusion of any admissible evidence at trial 
bearing on the defendant's duty is material regarding proximate causation and warrants a 
new trial if improperly excluded by the trial court. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
EXCLUDED THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT FROM 
EVIDENCE AND IT WENT DIRECTLY TO THE ISSUE OF 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION. 
The contract between the federal government and U-Systems was a material piece 
of evidence regarding proximate causation because it fleshed out aspects of defendant's 
duty of care to plaintiff as an employee of the federal government whose job duties 
required her to on and about the construction site. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that a party who breaches a duty of care toward another "may be found liable 
to the other in tort, even where the relationship giving rise to such a duty originates in a 
contract between the parties." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) 
See also Alder v. Bayer AGFA Div. 61 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002) and cases cited under Duty 
of Care. 
Here the defendant entered into a contract with the government which included 
specific obligations toward government employees in addition to a common law duty of 
care. The contract incorporated by reference and attachment Section 01000 which are 
"General Requirements" for construction (R. 296) Paragraph 1.14 (R.222) states: 
A. The Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements 
Manual, EM385-1-1, (see Contract Clauses Accident 
Prevention) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) Standards for Construction (Title 29, Code of Federal 
Regulations Part 1926 and Part 1910 as revised from time to 
time) and Air Force OSHA standards are all applicable to this 
contract. In case of conflict the most stringent requirements of 
the standards is applicable... 
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Paragraph 1.16 Protection of Government Property and Personnel in subparagraph 
B specified (R. 297): 
The Contractor shall conduct his work so the government 
property and personnel other personnel and work areas, shall be 
protected at all times from inconvenience, damage of any nature, 
or injury caused by this work until completion of the contract, 
(emphasis added) 
The contract referenced US Army Corps of Engineers Safety and Health 
Requirements Manual, Section 11.1.04 specifically says (R. 224-225): 
Tools, materials, and equipment subject to displacement and 
falling shall be adequately secured, (emphasis added) 
The contract also established a safety chain of command designating and placing 
primary site safety responsibility on U-Systems. (R. 296-304) 
The jury never received any of the above evidence because the contract and any 
reference to the contract provisions or requirements or chain of responsibility was 
excluded at trial. Here U-Systems undertook certain mandatory or affirmative safety 
duties running to plaintiff as a federal government employee in addition to its common 
law duty of care. 
Instead, the Court instructed the jury (Instruction No. 26, R. 567) only on a 
common law duty to exercise reasonable care. A mandatory or affirmative duty of care to 
a particular class of people is of a different type and character of duty than a common law 
duty of care when considering proximate causation. The jury found that plaintiff had 
proved common law negligence against defendant U-Systems but failed to prove 
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proximate causation. Hearing and seeing that the defendant for consideration accepted 
specific mandatory contractual obligations to protect plaintiff at all times from injury 
rather than a general common law duty and that all items subject to falling "shall be" 
secured under US Army Corps of Engineers guidelines sheds an entirely different light on 
defendant's responsibilities. When "the excluded evidence would probably have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict" Gaw v. State Dept. of 
Transportation, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) then a new trial is warranted. In the 
case at hand, the definition of "substantial" can be gleaned from the Court's discussion in 
Holmstrom v. C.R. England Inc., 8 P.3d 281 (Utah 2000). Generally, the concept of 
substantial in a proximate cause discussion means that "the actor's negligent conduct is 
not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been 
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §431 cnt. a (1965). 
Had the jury known that the defendant had undertaken an affirmative contractual 
duty of care running directly to plaintiff, there is a high probability the outcome would 
have been different on the question of proximate causation. 
POINT III. MR. TODD WAS A QUALIFIED 
CONSTRUCTION EXPERT CAPABLE OF TESTIFYING 
ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT 
SAFETY CODES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
REGARDING SAFE STORAGE OF SHEETROCK. THE 
TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY UPON THE 
MISCONCEPTION HE NEEDED TO HAVE UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE. 
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The trial court also erred in granting the defendant's motion in limine to exclude at 
trial the testimony of plaintiff s expert Ken Todd. (R. 330) The argument made by the 
defense was that Mr. Todd was not qualified to testify in Utah as to OSHA standards, 
their application, meaning and methods of implementation in the construction trade 
because he had not worked in Utah but instead had worked widely in Nevada and 
California. (R. 645, p.2) (R. 646, p. 3-4) 
The trial court ruled that Mr. Todd was a qualified construction expert. (R. 646, 
p.22, lines 24 and 25) He was prevented from testifying because he hadn't worked in 
Utah and the Court did not believe his testimony under Rule 702 would assist the jury in 
understanding the application and implementation of Federal OSHA standard 
1926.250(a)(1). (R. 646, p. 22-23) 
Plaintiff must show the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert 
testimony Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2 445 (Utah App. 1989) and that the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict, Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-4 (Utah 1987). 
However, the trial court does not properly exercise that discretion where its decision is 
based upon a misconception of law. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 
1988) 
In the case at hand, an understanding of Utah OSHA regulations and their 
application was simply not relevant. As set out above, the contract between the federal 
11 
government and U-Systems referenced Federal OSHA standards and US Army Corps of 
Engineers standards which have national application (R. 645, p. 9-10) (R. 646, p. 4-6) and 
a key issue at trial was what does Federal OSHA standard 1926.250(a)(1) mean in terms 
of implementation regarding the safe storage of sheetrock at a construction site. (R. 646, 
p. 8-10) The trial court instructed the jury (Instruction No. 44, R. 526) that "OSHA 
Regulation 1926.250(a)(1) may be considered by you as evidence of the standard of care" 
but the jury was completely deprived of what it means in terms of implementation within 
the construction industry. Mr. Todd was prepared to testify that in this case it meant that 
sheetrock is - either laid flat so it cannot fall or, if stacked or leaned vertically against a 
wall must be tied off to prevent it from falling exactly the mechanism of injury which 
occurred to plaintiff Yvonne Day. So, the jury was given the regulation without any 
explanation of how it was to be applied and implemented by the construction trade in 
order to be in compliance with 1926.250(a)(1). And, expert testimony that plaintiffs 
injury would not have occurred had the sheetrock been laid Hat or tied off goes directly to 
the heart of the issue of proximate cause in this case. 
Instead, what the jury heard without rebuttal other than plaintiff herself, was that it 
was a common practice in Utah to stack sheetrock vertically without tying it off. (R. 641, 
p. 119) Therefore, inferentially, there was no violation of Federal OSHA standard 
1926.250(a)(1). 
Testimony that compliance with Federal OSHA standard 1926.250(a)(1) and the 
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US Army Corps of Engineers safety standard necessitated that sheetrock be laid flat or 
tied off directly rebuts the defense argument that U-Systems was neither negligent or a 
proximate cause of plaintiff s injury and does not require construction experience in Utah, 
rather it requires only a knowledge of the application and implementation of the Federal 
OSHA standard. The federal standards are national in scope, it was a federal construction 
project, the contract specifically referenced those standards and it was undisputed that Mr. 
Todd possessed the requisite construction experience and expertise to testify concerning 
these national safety codes with which he was undeniably familiar. (Mr. Todd was a 
qualified construction expert - trial court. R. 646, p. 22, lines 24-25) 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court excluded from trial significant and substantial evidence bearing 
directly on the issue of proximate causation. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. 
DATED this ,yj DWl day of ^f>MJpJ»*/uf , 2005. 
£^f\£f 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
/ /'Attorney for Plaintiff/Appell 
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ADDENDUM 
General Requirements Paragraph 1.14 Safety Requirements A 
General Requirements Paragraph 1.16 Protection of Government Property 
and Personnel B 
US Army Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements Manual C 
Federal OSHA Standard 1926.250(a)(1) D 
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ADDENDUM A 
KRSM 001513 Repair Warehouse Siding DRMO Hill AFB, Utah 
All utility outages; and traffic closures including streets, parking lots, and pedestnan closures shall be 
scheduled during off duty hours and weekends unless otherwise approved by the Civil Engineenng 
Project Manager. All outages and closures shall be scheduled as far in advance as possible with the 
Civil Engineenng Project Manager and in no case less than 17 calendar days before the outage or clo-
sure. The Contractor shall obtain in wnting from the Civil Engineering Project Manager a statement 
or schedule giving the permissible times for the outage or closure for particular installations and the 
maximum time allowed for such outage or closure. The Contractor shall strictly observe such sched-
ules and will be held responsible for any violations. 
1.14 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
A. The Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements Manual, EM 385-1-1, (see Contract 
Clauses ACCIDENT PREVENTION) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
Standards for Construction (Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations Part 1926 and Part 1910 as 
revised from time to time) and Air Force OSHA standards are all applicable to this contract. In 
case of conflict the most stringent requirements of the standards is applicable. If recurring 
violations and/or gross violation indicate that the safety performance is unsatisfactory, 
corrective action shall be taken as directed by the Contracting Officer or the Civil Engineering 
Project Manager. 
B. Any cutting, welding, brazing, or other hot work shall comply with AFI 32-200 l/OO-ALC-
HAFBS 1, Attachment 16. A USAF Weldmg, Cutting and Brazing permit, AF Form 592, is 
required daily for all hot work. 
C. Contractor Confined Space Requirements: 
The government's project manager will provide contractors with a copy of the confined space plan 
for the confined space to be entered. A complete list of confined spaces is available from Ron 
James, 777-1429, in the Base Safety Office. The owning organization of the confined space has 
wntten a confined space plan for each confined space, which they own. This confined space plan 
identifies the hazards and control of those hazards. The contractor shall obtain a copy of the con-
fined space plan and obtain a confined space permit for the confined space they are to enter. Con-
tractor is responsible for the requirements listed below: 
1. Understand the confined space plan. Ask owners of the confined space any questions 
concerning the plan. Understand any lockout/tagout requirements of the confined space. 
2. Have their own confined space program for entry into the confined space. 
3. Ensure their personnel are confined space trained. 
4. Provide atmosphenc testing, entry equipment, and bamers. 
5. Provide own rescue plan. 
6. Inform Air Force facility supervisor when entry is to occur. 
7. Inform Air Force facility supervisor of any hazards introduced into their work area or 
change of environment, which creates a hazard for Air Force personnel. 
8. Inform Air Force facility supervisor when entry is complete. 
9. Inform Air Force Facility supervisor of any new hazards or changes in environment. 
1.15 COLD WEATHER PRECAUTIONS 
ADDENDUM B 
3. Section 1.14 of the "General Requirements" specifically made 
the Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements Manual regarding accident 
prevention and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) applicable to this 
contract. (Roy Reed deposition at Pages 35-36) (General Requirements, Section 
1.14) 
4. Further, Section 1.16 Protection of Government Property and 
Personnel in subparagraph B specified: 
The Contractor shall conduct his work so the 
government property and personnel, other 
personnel, and work areas, shall be 
protected at all times from inconvenience, 
damage of any nature, or injury caused by 
this work until completion of the contract. 
5. 29 CFR Part 1910.5(a) which is specifically referenced in the 
contract "General Requirements" (Section 01000) is the OSHA paragraph setting 
forth the General Applicability of OSHA Standards. It says in relevant part: 
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this 
Section, the standards contained in this part 
shall apply with respect to employments 
performed in a workplace in a State... 
6. 29 CFR Part 1910.12(a) is the paragraph which applies 
specifically to construction work. It says: 
"Standards" The standards prescribed in 
part 1926 of this Chapter are adapted as 
occupational safety and health standards 
under section 6 of this act and shall apply, 
according to the provisions thereof, to every 
ADDENDUM C 
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shall be provided with backlash guards. All 
slushera shall be equipped with rollers and druss 
covers, and anchored securely before slushing 
operations are started. 
ll.H.ll. Track guardrailsr lead rails, and frogs 
shall be protected or blocked to prevent a 
person *s foot from becoming wedged* 
11.H.12. Positive-acting stopblacfcs, derail 
devices, track states, or other adequate means 
shall be installed wherever necessary to protect 
persons from runaway or Moving railroad equipment. 
A quick-close type air valve shall be 
on each piece of pneumatic-powered 
Ing equipment. The 
then the equipment is 
>otto»-dump rail cars 
j devices* 
less held effectively 
»curely* 
jo ^ ovejtr under, or 
* is stopped and the 
sd and the^soptice 
11.H.13. 
provided 
is 
excess of 10 
otherwise 
horsepower 
11.1. HOUSEKEEPING 
11.1.01. All stairwaysr passageways, gangwayst 
and acce&sways shall be kept free of materials
 r 
supplies, and obstructions at all times, 
11.1.02. Loose or light material shall not be 
stored or left on roofs or floors that are not 
closed in, unless it is safely secured. 
11.1.03. Teolsr materials, extension cords, 
hoses, or debris shall not cause tripping or other 
hazard. 
11.1.04. ' Toolsr materials, and equipment subject 
to displacement or falling shall be adequately 
secured. 
11.1.05. JSwpty bags having contained lime, 
cement, and other dust-producing material shall be 
removed periodically as specified by the 
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Regulations (Standards - 29 CFR) 
General requirements for storage. - 1926.250 
4| OSHA Regulations (Standards - 29 CFR) - Table of Contents 
• Standard Number: 1926.250 
• Standard Title: General requirements for storage. 
• Subpart Number: H 
• SubPart Title: Materials Handling, Storage, Use, and Disposal 
(a ) (1 ) 
All materials stored in tiers shall be stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked, or 
otherwise secured to prevent sliding, falling or collapse. 
(a ) (2 ) 
Maximum safe load limits of floors within buildings and structures, in pounds per 
square foot, shall be conspicuously posted in all storage areas, except for floor or 
slab on grade. Maximum safe loads shall not be exceeded, 
(a ) (3 ) 
Aisles and passageways shall be kept clear to provide for the free and safe 
movement of material handling equipment or employees. Such areas shall be 
kept in good repair. 
( a ) (4 ) 
When a difference in road or working levels exist, means such as ramps, 
blocking, or grading shall be used to ensure the safe movement of vehicles 
between the two levels. 
..1926.250(b) 
(b) 
Material storage. 
